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Article 9

True Patriots: Justif ying A utonomy for Ladakh
Martijn van Beek
Department of Ethnography and Social Anthropology
Aarhus University, Denmark
email: etnomvb@moes.hum .aau.dk
When the first Ladakh Hill Development Council
(Leh) was sworn in on 3 September 1995, Le.h District
in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir regained a
measure of the autonomy that the Kingdom of Ladakh
had lost in the 1830s .1 The Ladakh Autonomous Hill
Deve lopment Councils Act 1995 , decreed by the
Pres id e nt a few months earli er, signified a major
co ncess ion on the part of State and Central
Government, especially considering the strategic and
political importance of Ladakh in the overall Kashmir
issue.2The 'Reasons for Enactment' accompanying the
Act sugges t a straightforward justification: a remote
mountain region in need and desirous of decentralization
of decision making is g iven its own administrative
body. At first glance, then, this is the stuff that many
indigenous peoples, many marginal groups in India and
around the world, dream about: a responsive government
recognizes the legitimate desires of a minority with a
distinct identity.
The Indian press hailed the institution of the Ladakh
Autonomous Hill
Development Council, Leh
(LAHDeC), with hea dlines such as "A New
Beginning"3 (Bagla , 1995); the Prime Minister, P.V .
Narasimha Rao, sent his congratulations to "the brave
people of Leh" and expressed his conviction that "this
would give tremendous boost to the developmental
activi ties in Leh and meet the aspirations of the people
of the region for all round progress "4; the Home
1

Conquered by the Dogra state a few years earlier,
Ladakh was an integral part of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir that was created through the Treaty of Amr.itsar
of 1842. While few Ladakhis would challenge the
reg ion 's association with India, the link with Kas hni.ir
has remained contentious.
2
See (India, 1995) for the full text of the Act. This text
is also available online at the website of The Mountain
Forum (http://www .mtnforum.org).
3
Pallava Bag Ia (1995) in Frontline.
4
P.V. Narasimha Rao, telegram toP. Namgyal, 3
September 1995.
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Minster joined in and the Governor of the State, General
K.V. Krishna Rao, addressed the first meeting of the
Council saying:
"Today, we have gathered here to mark one of the
most important turning points in the history of this
great land . This historic event also signifies that from
now on, the people of this land will preside over their
own destiny . ( ... ) It has been a longstanding demand of
the people here for the right to take decisions for their
own development. You had to undergo considerable
struggle in achieving this Hill Council. I am happy to
note that your struggle has been peaceful and democratic
means were used towards this end. This is a shining
example for every one in our great democratic country,
that one can achieve one's legitimate demands through
constitutional means."5
As the Governor's words suggest, Leh District did
not get its Hill Council without a struggle. Indeed, if
we trace the history of the demand for regional
autonomy, we need to go back at least to the 1930s.6 In
his speech , the Governor recognizes the length and
difficulty of the struggle and praises the Ladakhis for
having used peaceful, democratic means . Now that all is
settled, one can get on with the business of
development.
The Governor's speech, the journalists' writings and
the justification accompanying the Act offer an insight
Excerpt from "Address by General K.V. Krishna Rao,
PVSM (Retd), His Excellency the Governor of Jammu
and Kashmir to Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development
Council, Leh, on 3rd September, 1995."
6 Of course, Ladakhis also offered resistance to their
incorporation into the State in the first place in the
1830s and after, and the memory of independent Ladakh,
as we shall see, remains relevant today. However, in
terms of the modern political formulation of the demand
for regional autonomy, the 1930s and 1940s are where a
new form of representation and justification of the
demand can be seen to emerge for the first time .
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into the creation of an official history. This simplifi ed,
sanitized represe ntation of the struggle for region a l
autonom y and its outcome may e nter textbooks and
public memory, escaping the confines of the audiences
and purposes fo r w hich it is origin ally being composed:
to ju s tify c on cess ion s to a s mall bun c h of
tro ubl emake rs o n the fro ntiers o f the Nation throug h
safel y reinterpreting and representin g both histo ry and
solutions to the conflict as firmly within th e
constitutional, political, and nationalist bounds of the
nation -state. Ladakhis had leg itimate grievances and
they were recognized and addressed by the state .
The Government's willingness to accommodate the
Ladakhi demand must also be seen in the light of the
broader domestic and international politics of the
Kashmir issue, but one still needs to ask why the state
celebrates the strengthening of regionalist forces in this
case. This should at the very least lead us to ask
whether the granting of autonomy to Ladakh is in fact
an illustration of the possibility of successful resistance
to the hegemony of the nation-state and national
development project. The following analysis su ggests
that quite the reverse may be true: it is precisely its firm
location within the discursive and institutional frames
of nation -state and development project that makes the
empowerment of the Hill Council desirable from the
perspective of the state (and arguably from the
perspective of at least some of the Ladakhi leaders of the
agitation). It is clear that - considering how Ladakhi
representatives justified their claims in terms of
backwardness and patriotism-the demand did not pose a
threat to the national project and nationalist ideology of
the Union. This call for minority rights, in other words,
was anything but counter-hegemonic, and locally,
within Ladakh, was premised on the radical and at times
violent silencing of anOther Ladakhi community:
Muslims.?
Here, I will look at how political leaders in Ladakh
have presented and justified their demand for regional
autonomy over the years. I will show that these
representations relied on a complementary, but
apparently contradictory claim: that Ladakhis are
different from the rest of the Indian nation, but true
patriots nevertheless. The possibility of making this
claim in turn is premised on, first, an erasure and
sile ncing of difference within Ladakh (of class , gender,
religion, etc.). This was achieved by emphasizing the
region's geographical, cultural and socio-economic
7 Mu slims constitute close to 50% of the population of

Ladakh as a whol e . The vast majority of Muslims live
in Kargil d istrict and are Shias . In Leh town , there is a
s izable minority of Sunni M uslims, commonly referred
to as ;\ r Pon. From most official and popular
descriptions of Ladakh, its population and culture , the
presence of Muslims is either ignored or made into a
recent, essentially foreign deve lopment. For d iscussions
of the Mu slims in Ladakh, see e .g . (Dollfu s , 1991;
Dollfus, 1995; Grist, 1993; G rist , 1995 ; Rizvi , 1986) .
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uniqu e ness within Indi a, and later, durin g the 1989
ag itation, re inforced thro ugh the use of a communal
re prese ntat ion of Ladak h as Buddh ist. Th is second
move , of course, was important in enabli ng the Ladakhi
Buddhi st leadersh ip to contrast themse lves with the
O ther co mm unit ies in the wider State, above all
M us li m s . L adakhi sece ssioni s m, it wa s made
abundantl y clear, was a imed aga inst the State o f Jammu
and Kas hmi r , not the Union.
I will suggest th at we need to unders tand Ladakhi
politi cs, like politics e lsewhere , as a compl ex process
of negotiation , contestation , and rep rese ntation; a
' game' of strategic deployment of justifications , at once
makin g use of and con strain ed by the spaces made
available by the state 's own di scurs ive tropes. Ladakhi
politics, in other words, is the work of people whose
actions are guided by th eir reading and interpretation of
th e wide r politi ca l fi e ld , and the ir readin gs a nd
interpretation s , the ir action s, in turn help sh ape and
reconstitute that very same fi e ld . Formal po litics is, in
this sense, a question of per fo rmance, althou gh not just
performance.
Three central the mes em e rge from Ladakhi
representations: Ladakh is a poor and backward region ,
and home to a uniqu e , distin ct culture and peopl e ;
Kashmir ' s Government has neg lected Ladakh and has
fail ed to develop the reg ion; Ladakh ' s population are
true patriots and dedicated to the Nation. The same
th e mes are found also in th e mo re communal
representations, where Ladakhine ss is reduced to
Buddhism; th e Kas hmir Gove rnm ent is driv e n by
communal motivations; and the secessionists in the
Valley cannot be trusted precisely becau se they are
Muslims, while Ladakh's Buddhists are naturally part of
India .
As the followin g account will show, these the mes,
both in their communal and all-Ladakh form s , recur
from the time of the first representation presented on
behalf of the Buddhist communit y to the Glancy
Commission.8 More often than not, an all-Ladakh form
is chosen, with the notable exception of Partition, and
the 1969 and 1989 agitations. The first of these can be
understood in the context of uncertainty over Kashmir' s
future and the recent invas ion of Ladakh by Pakistani
'raiders .' The second and third are of a quite different
nature . In both Ladakhi politi cians consciously used a
communal frame to put pres sure on the State and
Centre . After the success , albe it limited , of the 1969
agitation, the benefits of communal strateg ies were clear
to the younger Ladak h B uddhi st Assoc iation (LB A)
leaders . The 1989 agitat ion , which led to the form ation
of the Hill Council in 1995, is uniqu e in the consistent
effort made by Ladakh i activists to control both internal

8 Under pressure from grow ing opposition again st his
rule, Maharaja Hari S ingh appo inted a Commission of
Inquiry "to look into grievances and compl a ints," that
became known by the name of its British chairman .
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and external representations and mobilizations, allowing
the effective positioning of the LBA as communalists
agai nst their w ill , rather than by choice. This enabled
them to champion the secular and deve lopmen talist
ideals of the Ind ian state, while pursuing a relentlessly
com munal campa ign 'at home.'

Pre-Independence Demands
The Buddhist community of Ladakh was probably
first formally represented on November 13, 1931, in
Srinagar. On this occasion B.J. Glancy Esq, I.C.S.,
C.S.I ., etc, Special Minister, His Highness'
Government, Jammu and Kashmir, asked a delegation
'representing' the Buddhists of Kashmir to submit a
"Memorandum ."
At this particular moment in subcontinental history,
'communalism' was seen and experienced as the most
important problem, the organizing principle of Indian
society, and certainly as the basis for political
organization. Kashmir may have been lagging behind
other parts of the Subcontinent in communalization,
but has done a lot of catching up. That is after all why
the Glan cy Commission is there in the first place. Its
task is explicitly to enquire into the grievances of
communities. Ladakh bein g a very marginal area, 'the'
Buddhists did not have any formal representation on the
commission, while Hindus and Muslims of Kashmir
and Jammu had a representative each, respectively.9 The
representation sought from the Buddhist Community
made sense within the frame of perception, analysis, and
operation of the Commission, and indeed of the
submitters, who went on to found the Kashmir Raj
Bodhi Maha Sabha. The 1935 Triennial Report of the
KRBMS states: "Those (1932) were the days of
political upheaval in the Kashmir State. The Sabha,
therefore, had to devote its attention and energy to the
cause of the forty thousand helpless and downtrodden
Buddhists of Ladakh whose case in the general scramble
for percentages, would, otherwise have gone by default."
(KRBMS, 1935)
In the memorandum, several important themes can
be distinguished. First, the idea of 'community' and
hence the possibility and desirability of 'representation'
is central. For the KRBMS leadership, having
experience and knowledge of the communal organisation
of Indian politics and the changing nature of state
involvement in allocations on a communal basis, to
represent and be seen to represent community is the
onl y way forward to the 'modern' civilized life.
Secondly, Progress , upliftment, etc ., are very much
central concerns of the Sab ha. Education, in their eyes,
is the key to civilization, survival, and progress. And
such things are ach ieved on a com munity basis.Their
communal understanding of progress and history is also
9 It was because of the desire for a Buddhist voice at the

Enquiry that the KRBMS was founded . (See also
Rabgias, 1984; Shakspo, 1988).
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seen in the reference to "amelioration" of the life of the
Ladakhi Buddhists, and in the goal being "equality" with
"the other communities inhabiting the State."
Community, in the KRBMS world view, is already
obj ectified · in a way which is quite unthinkable in
Ladakh itself at this point. I 0
Economic disadvantages were and continued to be
only a secondary concern of the KRBMS, as these were
seen to be caused precisely by the Ladakhi Buddhists'
educational 'backwardness.' Statistics were deployed to
strengthen the case for Buddhist discrimination,
legitimacy of demands, and need for appropriate action
by the Government. II The use of number here is also
an instrument to compare directly and competitively the
'status' and 'privileging' of the different
communities .12
A final theme to be mentioned here is the implicit
or explicit threat of violence. In the 1935 Report, which
was written for an international and national audience of
Buddhist Sabhas, this is stated as follows:
"Smarting under the sting of this grave injustice (the
lack of action by the Government) the Sabha was in
danger of drifting towards jingoist tactics- the favourite
weapon of other communties in those and later times
and giving loose rein to its deep resentment through
press and platform and in other ways . But the Sabha
refused to be carried Dff its feet and tenaciously held to
its creed of peaceful and constitutional representation."
(KRBMS, 1935: 4)--.

10 The central figure in the formulation of the views of
the KRBMS as well as in 'educating' Ladakhis in these
terms was Shridhar Kaul. Kaul was one of the founders
of the KRBMS, and as a civil servant of the J&K State
held a number of different education-related posts,
including that of 'inspector of schools.' Kaul was
mentor to many of Ladakh's reform-oriented political
and social activists, served as Kushok Bakula
Rinpoches's adviser and speech writer, and was one of
the central figures in promoting modern education in
Ladakh. Some consider him also to be the original
source of communalism in Ladakh.
11 As is evident from KRBMS 1935, there were several
representations made to the Commission in 1931-2.
Several issues mentioned in the 1935 discussion are not
to be found in the Mahabodhi reptint of the text of the
December 1931 memorandum. Missing from it, for
example, are issues such as consumption of chang,
Personal Law, inheritance, etc. Almost certainly these
issues were raised in other memoranda which I have
been unable to locate . (See Representatives of Kashmir
Buddhists, 1932). Bertelsen 1997 has a fuller account of
the various memoranda.
12 As we will see, there is a remarkable continuity in
the way number and statistics are used to present and
legitimize the 'Buddhist' case, but there are also
important differences between 1932 and 1989.
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The Government may not have trembled at the
prospect of an irate mob of four or five neo-Buddhist
Kashm iri Pandits marching down La! Chowk, but the
reference to Buddhist ahimsa combined with a thinly
veiled threat of violence will be seen to recur again and
again.
At this time , Ladakhis themselves played hardly any
role at all, be it in the expression of grievances,
presentation of memoranda, or formulation of
demands .13 This agenda, these strategies, these
representations, were the work of a very small group of
Kashmiri Pandits, Shridhar Kaul prominent among
them, who were well aware of the grammar of
contemporary politics in the 1930s, and who played
consciously to a wider national and indeed international
audience, and who understood themselves as 'elements
in a series' of communities.14 Yet, the 1931-2
representations to the Glancy Commission signify the
beginning of representations of Ladakhis (in this case
reduced to Buddhists) as a community. The language,
justifications, and claims of representation are those of
citizens and a community that can be compared to other
communities in terms of development and
backwardness, and these citizens and their community
can make demands rather than appeals. As citizens in a
democratizing state they have rights.

A Separate Nation by all the Tests
The formation of the Ladakh Buddhist Education
Society in 1932-3, succeeded by the Young Men's
Buddhist Association in 1938, constituted the beginning
of Buddhist political organization in Ladakh itself. IS
l3 Ladakhis are refen·ed to by Kaul as "dumb-diiven
catttle" in the Memorandum. They certainly could not
be expected to represent themselves.
l4 Further representations to the J&K government, with
responses which "cannot be called unsatisfactory" were
made by the KRBMS on 18 June, 1932 and 13 March
1934. I have been unable to locate documents pertaining
to these events and must rely on KRBMS 1935.
15 There is considerable confusion over the sequence of
events in this period . Shakspo (1988) suggests that the
Young Men's Buddhist Association was founded in
1934. However, the Minutebook of the YMBA shows
that their founding meeting did not take place until
1938. In these minutes there is mention of the Buddhist
Education Society of Ladakh and we (Kristoffer Brix
Bertelsen and myself) are now convinced that this is
indeed the earliest organization of this kind. An
"Informative Questionnaire" submitted by the YMBA's
successor, the LBA, in 1985 to the World Fellowship
of Buddhists, gives the date of establishment of the
YMB /> "~Apr il 1937. Given the Minutebook,
however , it is fair to assume that this is one year off the
mark. In another similar summary of the history of the
organi zation in the archives of the LEA, 1934 is given
as the founding date, further adding to the confusion.
Ganhar & Ganhar (1956: 224) take 1938 as the
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The YMBA helped to solidify the outside perception
that Ladakhi Buddhist representations were more or less
sufficiently representative of Ladakhi voices as such.
The traumatic events surrounding part ition and the
accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir added to
· this communalized imagining of Ladakh . On the eve of
Nehru's first visit to the region in July 1949, this
communal perspective is a lso clear in a representation
made by Ka lan Tsewang R igzin on behalf of the
Buddhists of Ladakh 16 By and large, the representation
made the same kinds of claims and comp laints as were
raised earlier. A new element was the emp hatic
representation of Ladakh as a nation, and hence having
the right to self-determination. It is also in this
representation that the right to regional autonomy was
first asserted.
In the representation, the Ladakh Buddhist
Association (LBA), "on behalf of the People of Ladakh"
reiterated three proposals that were made to the Maharaja
through the Praja Sabha in 1947. The proposals entailed
that Ladakh should either be ruled directly by the
Maharaja, or "amalgamated with the Hindu majority
parts of Jammu should form a separate province" or
alternatively, that Ladakh should be perm itted to join
with East Punjab. In the new representation, it is
pointed out that the first two options were merely in
deference to the Treaty of Amritsar, and that really only
the third option, direct merger with India, would be "a
guarantee for our future progress and development." So,
in the submission to Nehru, the LBA asks to be merged
directly with India (i.e. seperated from Kashmir). The
memorandum contains the following striking passage:
"We are a separate nation by all the tests-race,
language, religion, culture-determining nationality.
The only link connecting us with the other people of
the state being the bond of common ruler. If the Indian
National Congress could persuade itself to recognise the
Muslims of India as a separate nation although they had
so much in common with the other elements of the
Indian population the Government of India should have
no hesitation in recognising what is patent and
incontrovertible fact in our case. ( .. .)
The right to self-determination claimed by us cannot
be claimed with equal force by the people of Baltistan
including Skardu and parts of Karg il tehsils
predominantly populated by Muslims, as they are
connected by ties of religion with the majority

founding year. In Bertelsen's and my own opinion, the
Minutebook as a contemporary document must be
regarded as the most reliable source in this regard. For
the most elaborate discussion of the historical evidence,
see Bertelsen (1997).
16 I have been unable to find an original copy of the
Memorandum. I am relying here primarily on its
citation in Kaul and Kau l (1992 :184) , and Madhok
(198 5). The event is also mentioned briefly by Lamb
(1993:196) .
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community in Jammu & Kashmir, nor by the people of
Gilgit who ca me under Dogra rule throu gh conquest
after the annexation of Kas hmir an d whom not only
identity of religion but of race as well binds to the
majority community of Jammu & Kas hmir." (quoted in
Madhok , 1963: 183-4)
At thi s time Shridhar Ka ul still had much influence
on Ladakhi representation s , and it is quite likely that he
would have had a hand in formulatin g the memorandum .
Its firm assertion of the ri ght to self-determination is
striking, and repeated in different forms throughout the
document. Ladakhis are a nation and therefore should be
allowed to choose their own destiny . Moreoever, it is
clear from the wording that Ladakhi is here understood
as Buddhist, as in its description of the territories of
Ladakh it emphasises those "predominantly inhabited by
Boudhs ." (Madhok, 1963 : 184)
Not surprisingly, Nehru was less than thrilled by the
Ladakhi demand . Given the disputed nature of the status
of Kashmir, it would have been imprudent to make any
separate arrangement for Ladakh. According to H .N.
Kaul, the son of Shridhar Kaul who was present at the
meeting , Nehru was sympathetic, but would not give in
and the Ladakhi delegation "did not, therefore, press its
demand for a 'Union Territory Status' for Ladakh in
national interest and on the Prime Minister's assurance
that th e ir grievances would be looked into and
addressed." 17
During their visit to Leh, a few weeks later, Nehru
and Sheikh Abdullah ceded to local Ladakhi pressure (of
a non -co mmunal nature) and replaced the Kalon with
Bakula Rinpoche.18 This move signified the
incorporation of a section of Ladakh 's elite in the
process of decision making at the State level, silencing
the threat of a general claim for secession of Ladakh
from Kashmir. Bakula Rinpoche and his associates
profited politically from the reforms carried out by

l7 Interestingly, a second delegation from Ladakh called
upon Nehru on 20 May 1949, this time headed by
Kushok Bakula Rinpoche, the head of the Gelugpa
branch of Tibetan Buddhism in Ladakh. This
delegation, according to Kaul and Kaul, "urged the
Prime Minister that 'the territorial integrity of the
Jammu and Kashmir State of which their country is a
part be maintained and that the State as a whole remain
with India." Still according to Kaul and Kaul, Bakula
Rinpoche protested the Kas hmir dominated
ad ministration of Ladakh and argued, as was done by the
LBA, that with the transfer of Sovereignty the Treaty of
Amritsar of 1846 no longer applied and hence Ladakh
was free to choose its own destiny. Significantly, the
memo refe1Ted to a possible reunification with Tibet if
Ladakh were not tied directly to the Indian Union . (Kaul
and Kaul 1992 : 185).
18
This event is sometimes referred to as the 'Coup at
Choglamsar Bridge'. See van Beek 1996 for details.
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Sheikh Abdullah in the fi rs t years of his reign .1 9
However, Ladakh itself was felt to be neglected by the
State, leadi ng Bakula Rinpoche to deliver a scathing
attack on the S tate Government during the budget
session in 1953. This was the fi rs t all-out
condemnation of the State Government by Ladakhi
representatives. Its language was largely patriotic and
non-communal, although the alleged discrimination by
the State was asserted to be expressive of communalism
of the State Government: Ladakh is not communal, but
the State is; therefore, Ladakh needs protection from the
State by the Centre .
The speech includes many comparisons of the
present regime of Abdullah with the previous regime of
the Maharaja. In this context, the promises and claims
of representation and democracy, of socialism and
nationalism, made by Nehru and Abdullah during their
visit in 1949, as well as the general rhetoric of
nationalism are used as a basis for justifying Ladakhi
demands. This speech, then, constitutes another
illustration of the fundamental shift in regimes of
justification, from subject to national citizen, that
makes available such references to justice and equality.
At the same time, Bakula Rinpoche is obviously
staking a claim to Ladakh's right to self-determination,
challenging the 'natural' integration of the region with
India. Such a statement in this phase of the dispute over
Kashmir was bound to receive attention from the
Central Government in New Delhi .
The furore caused by the speech, fueled by its
widespread coverage in the press, led to some proposals
by Sheikh Abdullah, including a reorganization of the
District's administration. However, Bakula Rinpoche
declined the offer as it fell short of meeting the demand
for direct association with India, a demand he restated
once again in a press statement released on 9 June 1952.
Consequently, in spite of Bakula Rinpoche's eloquent
speech, no action from the government on his demands
was forthcoming. Regardless of possible sympathy with
Ladakh's plight on the part of Nehru, the larger issue of
Kashmir would have prohibited any major concession to
Ladakh, in particular any rearrangement of the tenitorial
and administrative composition of the State.
Bakula Rinpoche's failure to secure concessions for
Ladakh, the slow pace of development, and perceptions
of corruption of the National Conference leaders in
Ladakh, led to the emergence of a young, more radical,
opposition to Bakula Rinpoche in the early 1960s. This
group in 1969 launched an agitation along communal
lines. While the initiative for the agitation was taken by
the opposition, Bakula Rinpoche joined in and led
negotiations with the State. It is said that limited
concessions were granted by the State in return for
19 The most important of these were a land reform
(which had little real impact in Ladakh) and a settlement
of debts through state mediation (which meant a great
relief to many households) .
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Bakula Rinpoche's disavowal of the more radical
demands of the agitators . Consequently, the central
demand fo r regional autonomy was not met. There is no
space here to di scuss the compl ex and intri guin g
politics of Ladakh at the time , but the events of 1969
were understood by youn ger political activi sts to hold
two important lesson s: communa lism gets results, and
the old elite in Ladakh cannot be tru sted. Both lessons
were applied in the context of the 1989 agitation.20

Most demands and compl a ints prese nted to th e
government in the course of the 1989 agitation were
shared· by Mu slim s and B uddhi sts alike, and in spite of
the initial commun al fl are-up , early publi c statements
were rather non-commun al in to ne. For example, the
' official' beginning of the agitation can be traced to July
18, 1989, when the LBA he ld a general meet ing at
Chokhan g Vihara at Le h and ad opted the followin g
resolution:

Defensive Commu nalism ?
Agitation

"We the Buddhist of Ladakh , assembled here at thi s
Historic Chokhang Vihara , Leh o n the 15th day of the
fifth month of Buddhist calendar i.e . on 18th day of July
1989, do hereby resolve and adopt as under: -

The 1989

Although the agitation did not really start until the
summer of 1989, already in December 1986 rumblings
of communal dissent were beginning to re-emerge in
Ladakh .21 In a memorandum submitted to the Prime
Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, during his visit to Leh on 12
December 1986, the LBA wrote:
"It is an irony of history that the once predominant
Buddhist population of the region is being, on the sly,
pushed into minority status. This is being done so
through a discreet, deliberate policy of discrimination
and bias pursued by the successive regimes of the State
Government. The Government, which is predominantly
of the same community as the one that has been
seeking protection of minority rights and identity in the
Union Government has been the bullying agent with
respect to the Buddhist community of Ladakh. On the
other hand the Buddhist community, by its very nature,
has been very secular, accommodating and tolerant."22
The grievances listed in the memorandum are the
usual ones, but with particular prominence given to the
issue of conversion. It is alleged that "the Muslim
community of the region hand in glove with the State
Government have embarked on a conversion spree."23
Again, see van Beek 1996 for detail. A shorter
discussion can be found in van Beek and Bertelsen
( 1997).
21 In the intervening peiiod, a non-communal but no
less divided political practice had dominated Ladakh. The
most important collaborative effort was a campaign for
Scheduled Tiibe status. A truly all-Ladakh forum led the
movement, but failed to get more than promises from
various Central governments. Here, too, then, the
lesson was that a non-communal effort would get no
results. For detail, see van Beek (1997).
2 2 Memorandum submitted to Rajiv Gandhi, 12
December 1986. Signed by President LBA, Tondup
Sonam.
23 The issue (or fear) of conversion is an old one, going
back to at least the times of Shridhar Kaul and the
KRB Mc;: The issue had gained new salience also
through a seiies of incidents involving the small
Chiistian community in Ladakh. In 1988 an LBA
agitation targeted them for the alleged 'kidnapping' of
Buddhist children by a missionary group from Mizoram
who had established a Chiistian school in Siinagar.
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That on 7th of July 1989 a mob consisting of some
sunni Muslims ancL Kashmiri s attacked and tri ed to
cause damage to the Chokhang Vihara by throwin g
explosives inside the premises of the Vihara.
That no action has so far been taken by the State
Government against Kashmiris and other miscreants.
That the State Law and Order machin ery having
failed to protect lives and properties of the Buddhists
living in Srinagar, wherefrom the Buddhist Students and
families are being forced to flee to Lad akh or Jammu.
Realising that Ladakh has alway s been treated as a
colony and Ladakhis as a third rate c itizens of J&K
State and accordingly, Ladakh having been neglected in
every sphere of life Soc ially, Politically and
economically. We firmly resolve to launch a movement
for an alternative administrative se tup wherein the
ethnic cultural and traditional identity of Ladakhis is
safeguarded and that alternative is in declaiing Ladakh as
a Union Tern tory.
Therefore, this gatherin g , consistin g of
representatives from all over Ladakh, do, hereby, resolve
that we shall not rest in peace untill Ladakh is declared
as a Union Territory ."24
The resolution makes it cl ear that although the
movement is launched by the LBA, representing the
Buddhists of Ladakh, it does seek to defend the interests
of all Ladakhis. Only the Sunni community is accu sed
of involvement in the rioting, a doo r bein g kept open
for the vast majority of Shia Muslims in Ladakh to join
the agitation. The resolution was a lso immediately
distributed to major news agencies , including PTI and
UNI.
The attempt to show LBA interes t in an all -Ladakh
struggle was fu rther strengthened by the publi cation of
posters , pamphlets , and publi c statements under the
name of Ladakh Pe opl e's M ove me nt fo r Union
Territory Status (LPMUT). The prime targets in these
publications were invaiiably Kas hmiris , and these were
alleged to have "indoctrin ated" loca l S unni M uslims .
This, of course, was a smart strategy. F irst, it allowed
the LBA to pose as non-communal. Yet it must also be
24

LBA, Resolution dated 19 Jul y, l989.
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remembered that it is in this period that the armed
resistance in Kas hmir proper was gathering momentum.
Hence, the seasona l traders from Kashmir, mostly
vegetable and souven ir se llers, cou ld be accused of
bringing "the secessionist culture of the valley into this
strateg ica lly important region of the State."25 Reference
was made time and again to pro-secessionist slogans
raised in Leh bazaar and the need for the government to
chase 'Pakistani agents' from Ladakh. All this enabled
the LBA to position itself as patriotic and noncommunal, and strengthened its ability to gain the
sympathy of not only Central authorities, but also wide
sections of the media. A LPMUT spokesman said at a
press conference in Delhi that "excluding Sunni
Muslims with terrorist connections, all other
communities supported their agitation. He particularly
referred to the Kargil area dominated by the Shia
Muslims. The Shia Muslims are also aggrieved against
the domination of the Sunni settlers from Kashmir who
have complete control over all the major economic
activities." 26
A booklet entitled Ladakh People's Movement for
Union Territory Status: an Information Booklet, printed
in Delhi, was widely disseminated amon g press and
politicians. The parallels between this document and the
1935 Triennial Report of the KRBMS cited earlier are
striking. Again, we find Ladakhis, or rather the LBA,
presenting their case using government statistics to
prove their claim of discrimination, references are made
to the patriotism of Ladakhis as opposed to Kashmiris,
and so forth. But by this time the guise of the LPMUT
can barely be maintained.27
A very prominent feature of the LPMUT pamphlet
is its singling out of the sunni Muslims of Leh for
criticism, and effectively denying their Ladakhiness.
Speaking of the post-Independence period, it says:
"The most unfortunate part was that in all these evil
designs the State Government used the Argons (a
handful of Sunni Muslims of Kashmiri origin settled in
Leh). Acting as Ladakhis they allowed themselves to be
used as agents to the Kashmir Government in the
execution of all their evil designs . The Government in
25

A spokesman for the LPMUT in a press conference
at Delhi, quoted in Hindustan Times, 8 August, 1989.
2 6 Hindus tan Times, 8 August 1989. It is far beyond
the scope of this discussion to go into the divergent
origins of Sunni Muslims in Leh, just as it is
impossible to address the 'truth value' of the ·
accusations levelled against them and other targets. of
the LBA. The issue in the present analysis is not
whether or not all these accusations, claims, and
counterclaims are based on 'reality', but on their
reception, deployment, and interpretation.
2 7 In fact, the draft of the booklet openly states its
provenance as LBA, Chokhang Vihara, Len. The printed
version gives the same address, but omits mention of
the LBA.
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return made them into rich contractors with apparently a
license to deal in wholesale, the future and fortune of
Ladakhis. And for their untamed youth, pampered by the
state and protected by the law, it has become usual to
assault Buddhist youths and mollest (sic) women. These
elements ( . . . ) led Ladakh into a major communal
conflicts in July last, when after a well planned assault
on a Buddhist youth they went on to stone at the
peacefully protesting demonstrations from the Mosque
building."(Ladakh Peoples Movement for Union
Ten-itory Status, 1989: 4 emphasis added)
The pamphlet reiterates the by now familiar themes.
The trouble in Ladakh is dubbed "unfortunate for this
strategically sensitive region of Ladakh, but also an
insult to the nation as a whole," thereby claiming nonSunni patriotism. Also, the theme of Buddhist
traditional peacefulness is brought forward: "Today the
people of Ladakh realize that the gentleness and
tolerance inherent in their age-old culture are being
mistaken for cowardice and helplessness ." And the
"source of all the evils," the "root cause of all the feuds
and problems in Leh" is unambiguously identified as
"the Kashmir Government." (all quotes from Ladakh
Peoples Movement for Union Ten-itory Status, 1989: 4)
In the LPMUT pamphlet, the theme of patriotism is
particularly strong. The Sunni Muslims are accused that
"they have begun to ape their Kashmiri secessionist
brethrens by indulging in anti-national activities."
"Pro-Pak activists from the valley · have been
imported into the district, at their behest to create chaos
and subversion. Elements with established links with
Kashmiri terrorists, disguised as businessmen, have
been indoctrinating the Sunni youth. Pro-Pak slogan
shouting has become a day to day affair. Attempts are
made to transplant the secessionist culture of the valley
into the region. To all such activities, the Government
and the police have turned a Nelson's eye. Perhaps, that
suits them well!"
The Muslims of Leh, at least in terms of
representations, had been slow to respond in an
organized manner, it appears. Only in October 1989 a
booklet was published seeking to show that, in fact,
Ladakhis as a whole have suffered under Kashmir. After
first arguing that the agitation, contrary to the claims of
the LBA, is indeed targeting the Muslim community as
a whole, and listing a series of attacks on Muslim
property, the document reproduces two memoranda and a
"supporting document" on the "origin and evolution of
the Ladakhi Muslims." The first memorandum is from
the "Kargil District Action Committee" headed by Agha
Sayed Hussain Al-Mousavi:
"When one talks of Ladakh, one is talking of about
1,50,000 people of mixed Indo-Aryan (Dard, Kashmiri
and other Indian origin) and Mongoloid descent living
along the course of the high Indus and its tributaries; of
a people who profess Islam and Budhism in equal
numerical strength and yet speak the same language in
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different phonetic forms, share the same cultural roots
and life style despite the difference in faith.

a scapegoat on this account may not be in the overall
national interest."

2 . That in this extensive mountainous region of
India more than 75,000 Muslims (estimated) live as
widely spread as do theBudhists is a fact made less
known to the world for a variety of partisan political
reasons. ( . .. ) Uptill now close inter-caste family
associations, especially in Leh, had bound the people of
the region as a homogenous group. Alas! the current
Budhist agitation has severely damaged these cohesive
traditions .

The declaration of ST took some of the wind out of
the sails of the agitation. For one, press reports began
· to reflect the local Muslim perspective on the events,
pointing towards the privileging of the Buddhists in the
ST Iist.29 Also, the Government's insi ste nce that
granting UT status would prejudice the Indian claim on
Kashmir and further fuel the insurrection in the Valley
was widely supported in the mainstream press.
Nevertheless, as the Hind11stan Times noted in an
editorial, there was a genuine need for a reform of the
region's administrative setup .

3. The people outside Ladakh have been given to
understand through press briefings by the Ladakh
Budhist Association that the Muslims of Ladakh,
particularly the Sunni-Muslims of Leh, are 'outsiders'
and 'recent settlers'. In particular some extremist
Budhist ideologues are playing up the DOGRA
CONNECTION of the Leh Muslims in the belief that
the DOGRA General Zorawar Singh had patronized their
settlement in Leh during his Ladakh conquest. But
scores of history books written by famous European
scholars, indeed the very indigenous 'Ladakh
Chronicles' refute this wild and recent theory. These
documents bear testimony to the fact that while the
earliest 'Balti' (Shia Muslim) settlement had come into
being when King Jamyang Namgyal of Ladakh (16th
Century) had invited 7 Muslim traders from Kashmir to
become his 'Khar-Chog-Pa' or palace traders. And in
consequence of the Tibeto-Mongol invasion of Ladakh
during 1681, the Ladakhi King built the famous Leh
Mosque and he himself had briefly converted to Islam.(.
.. ) (Muslims of Leh and Kargil, 1989: 15-16)
This memorandum, like the booklet as a whole,
challenges many of the claims of the LBA, but
especially the erasure of Muslims from Ladakhiness.
The effect of the booklet was negligible . Few
newspapers reported on it, and public opinion outside
Kashmir Valley remained effectively controlled by the
LBA and its allies.

ST Gained, UT Lost:
Council

Towards a Hill

On October 8, 1989 the Government made its first
concession. Practically the entire population of Ladakh
were declared as members of eight Scheduled Tribes. At
the same time, the Government appeared to be reluctant
to be seen meeting Ladakhi demands. Ladakh's Buddhist
leadership feared that the explosive situation in Kashmir
was keeping the government from making a gesture that
might upset the Valley militants even more. Bakula
Rinpoche surmised as much in a letter to the' Prime
Minister released to the Press in late September
1989 .28 He "warned that making Ladakhi vital interest
28

Bakula Rinpoche at this time was serving as Member
of the National Commission on Minorities. While he
played no part in the conception of the agitation, he did
constitute an important presence at the Centre. With the
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Talks held between LBA, LMA, Centre and State on
October 29, 1989,' were successful. The Central
Government and J&K Government agreed to consider an
"Autonomous District Hill Council" for the region and
would drop all pending cases in connection with the
agitation. In return, the LBA suspended the agitation,
dropped the demand for a Union Territory and promised
to work towards restoring "harmony and brotherhood
among the Buddhists and the Muslims and other
communities in the region."30

The Long Wait
The implementation of this Tripartite Agreement
was to be delayed until 1995. In June 1990, then Home
Minister, Mufti Mohd. Sayeed visited Ladakh and the
LBA Vice-President, Tundup Sonam, wrote to him
complaining about the lack of progress in
implementing the tri-partite agreement, emphasizing
once again Ladakh is' patriotism as "sentinels for the
nation in four wars."31 The LBA had reason to be
frustrated as the government, at the State and Central
level, had not stuck to their part of the deal. However,
the LBA, too, had failed to meet its promises, in
particular with regard to lifting the social boycott of the
Muslims .32 State and Centre, moreover, were hiding

deepening of the crisis in Kashmir and the imposition
of Governor's rule on the State, the good relations
between the three Ladakhis at the Centre (Bakula
Rinpoche, the Lok Sabha member and later Minister
P.Namgyal, and Lama Lobzang) and leaders of the
Congress (I) were increasingly important.
29 The Sunni Arghons were denied ST status. Their
appeal was still under consideration at the time of
wtiting.
30 Hindustan Times, 31 October 1989.
31 Thupstan Sonam, Vice-President, LBA, letter to
(J&K) Home Minister Mufti Mohd. Sayeed, 8 June
1990.
32 This social boycott, me len chu len chad in Ladakhi,
was imposed by the LBA on all Buddhists in the
summer of 1989, banning all interactions with
Muslims. This policy was enforced through an elaborate
system of informers, and violators were subjected to
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behind one another 's backs, with the State proclaiming
the declaration of a Hill Council beyond the jurisdiction
of the State, and the Centre saying that Article 370
prevented it from unil atera ll y taking such a step. In
addition, though, the authorities realized that they could
not simply ignore the Mus lims of the region. The
question was how to get out of the deadlock.
After the social boycott had finally been lifted at the
end of 1992 , the LMA and LBA had come together in
the formation of what was called the "Coordination
Committee." Among its members were representatives
of the Sunni, Shia, Christian and Buddhist population .
On 8 September 1992, this Coordination Committee
called a press conference to announce an ultimatum to
the Government: grant Hill Council by October 15, or
the agitation will resume. As always, care was taken to
ensure the presence of journalists, and the ultimatum
was indeed widely covered.33 The late Akbar Ladakhi,
then president of the LMA, also announced that the
LBA had expressed its support for the inclusion of the
Sunni Argons in the ST list, further illustrating the
now united stand of Leh's Muslim and Buddhist
representatives.
On 9 October 1993, the Central Government
announced the succesful conclusion of talks with LBA
and LMA representatives in New Delhi on the details of
the Hill Council Act. Only a few minor issues, such as
the name for the council, were left to be resolved. The
Leh delegation was received in Ladakh with a victory
parade. It soon became apparent that the celebrations
were premature, and implementation of the agreement
was to take another two years.
In January 1994, P . Namgyal wrote to Home
Minister S .B . Chavan noting that it had been "reliably"
learnt that the draft bill no longer contained the word
'autonomous.' This was unacceptable for the LBA, who
were getting impatient with the delay since they had
been assured speedy passage of the bill . In Aplil, LBA
President Thupstan Chhewang also wrote to S .B.
Chavan, warning him that without a Hill Council for
Leh, Ladakhis would boycott any attempt at reviving
the political process in the State, something the
Congress government was desperate to achieve for
domestic and international purposes. Angry over the
new delays, the LBA and LMA once again jointly
threatened to relaunch the agitation on 20 June 1994,
and told S .B .Chavan as much during his visit to Leh on
the 15th.34 After assurances by Rajesh Pilot, Minister
of State for Internal Security, that the Hill Council
issue wo uld be tackled soon, the Coordination

fines, and other punishments, including physical
.
violence.
33
See e.g. Hindustan Times, 9 September 1993;
Indian Express, 10 September 1993.
34 Thupstan Chhewang and Akbar Ladakhi, letter to
S .B. Chavan, 15 June, 1994.
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Committee agreed to postpone the agitation, but
another year passed.
Throughout the summer and early autumn of 1994
rumou rs continu ed to circulate that Hill Council was
immin en t.35 The mood among the leadership was
optimistic, but the final stages of the struggle were far
from easy . Having the experience of many unfulfilled
promises in the past , Ladakh's leaders hip were not in a
mood to sit back and wait. Moreover, as Thupstan
Chhewang said: "We were suspicious that the Centre
would link it up with the overall Kashmir issue, and we
feared that if there's a popular government in Kashmir
again, the Hill Council might be shelved permanently,
since they have never been particularly sympathetic to
giving autonomy to Ladakh ."36 So the agitation was
re-launched once more with a mass rally on March 6,
1995.
The ferocity of public sentiment must have stirred
the government into action, because one day before a
planned Youth March, during which "anything could
have happened" as one leader put it, a high level
delegation came to Leh with a mandate from the PM to
announce that Hill Council would be establ ished within
a month.37 The Ladakhi leadership agreed to de-escalate,
but not to suspend the agitation, and gave an ultimatum
of May 15 for the law to be passed . A dharna in the
main bazaar continued a while longer until, finally, on
May 8 the announcement was made that the bill had
been passed.

Conclusion
The Indian press and the Governor representing the
state could celebrate Ladakh's Hill Council precisely
because Ladakh's leadership (itself a 'collective' of
varying and contradictory composition) presented its
claims and represented Ladakh within the bounds of the
35 The following section draws on my "Leh's Got It!",
Himal, July/August 1995.
36 Thupstan Chhewang, personal communication March
1995.
37 'Anything' in this case referred to a carefully planned
simultaneous bombing of most important Government
offices. It is worth noting that throughout the 19891995 peliod sticks of dynamite were set off every now
and then to keep the authorities aware of the
continuation of the agitation. Public rallies in Leh in
March 1995 signified a new strategic development in
that for the first time anti-Central government slogans
were raise. At two rallies a red banner was carried with
Chinese characters . According to one of the people
behind that particular initiative, the characters simply
stated that 'We want our Rights,' or something to that
effect. Obviously, such a banner was intended as a
severe provocation to the Government. One LBA leader
referred to the use of this banner as 'childish and stupid'
as it served no purpose and damaged the LBA's image as
true patriots.
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rules of the game: patriotic, democratic, and secular.
How e lse could the state have celebrated its loss of
power?
The use of a communal strategy, interspersed with
all-Ladakh representations, demands,
c laim s, and ju stification s, shows how a particular fie ld
of politi ca lly recogni zable idioms and practices was
structurin g decisions, strategies, and actions in Ladakh .
Thi s negotiation and contestation of the limits of the
(politicall y) possible (and imaginable) has enab led and
constrained Ladakh options, as well as 'outside' ones.
Simi larly , this contested construction of a new
politica l-administrative structure for Ladakh has itself
become avai lable for other local movements in other
parts of India, transforming the field of politics and
Centre-State- loc al relations. Already in the summer of
1995 the Zangskar Buddhist Association launched an
ag itation modelled clearly on the LBA strategy and
rhetoric, c la imin g discrimination by Kas hmir and
Muslim -dominated Kargi l district, and demanding a
separate Hi ll Counci l for the area.
no~ -c ommun a lized

The question remains whether this development of
of power to local -decision making bodies, is
In Itself a positive development, or not. A
straightforward answer is not possible. While the Hill
Council offers a chance to Ladakhi political leaders to
formulate and implement policies that they deem
suitab le or desirable for Ladakh, its conception is based
~n a com~una li zed political frame whose logic of
lngmentation has no logical or necessary end . The Hill
Counci l was achieved at the cost of constructing and
enforcin~ a conception of Ladakhiness that leaves space
for Muslims only as an expression of the tolerance of
~he real La~akhis: Buddhists . More importantly, the
mtra-Buddhtst homogeneity that the communalist frame
posits and indeed requires, is not to be found in Ladakh.
The issues that gave rise to the demand for regional
autonomy, namely the dislocations and perceived
discriminations in the context of livel ihoods, remain
unaddressed through the Hi ll Counci l per se. In fact, it
is precisely its acceptance of both the representational
logic of the nation -state's project and its modernizing
(and now g lobalizing) developmentalist project that
made possible the 'success' of the Hill Council
agitation.
dev~lution

Ladakh's leadership, both in communal and allLadakh agitations, successfu lly represented themselves
as true patriots, depicting the Kashm ir government as
communalists and the population as secessionists. To
grant Ladakhis what they demanded, then, could be
justif ied within the terms of the national project of
d e v e l~p me nt and the integrity of the nation's territory .
Even m the communal period of the 1989 agitation, the
LBA ;:,~ : itioned itself as communalist against its will,
merely defending the Buddhists against the
communalists from Kashmir. As a poster proclaimed:
"May it be known to all that there is one source of all
evils : Kashmir govt . & its agents in Leh;. one solution
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to all the problems: free Ladakh from K ashmir. One
goal, one demand of all the peop le." Autonomy for
Ladakh could be justified quite comfortably in the terms
of the nation's own understanding o f itself: democratic,
. secu lar and dedicated to the deve lopment of the e ntire
nation. With the rise of armed rebe llion in Kas hmir and
the increasin g virulence of H indu nationalism and anti Mus lim sentiment in other parts of India, Ladakh ' s
Buddhist leaders saw their chance of success in playin g
the communal card for all its worth. Thi s also re flected
the common ly held perception that 'the system' is
communal, so there is no alternative . Leh now has its
Autonomous Council, earned through decades of
struggle and a carefu ll y crafted strateg y of
representations of Ladakh as backward, neglected, yet
populated (mostly) ~y patriots. The demand was , after
all, reasonable, justifiable. Whether it will make any
difference in terms of peoples' lives , remains to be seen.
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